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NOTES
The Constitutionality of Compulsory Attorney Service:
The Void Left by Mallard
Many attorneys recognize and accept the duty to perform pro bono work as
an ethical responsibility of membership in the legal profession. Whether this
duty may take the form of a mandatory requirement, however, is another question. In Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa I the United States Supreme Court held that the federal in forma pauperis
statute2 does not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to
3
represent an indigent in a civil action.
This Note examines the Mallard decision in light of the history of indigent

representation and the development of an individual's right to counsel. The
Note concludes that the Mallard Court's interpretation of section 1915(d)--the

in forma pauperis statute-comports with the legislative history and language of
the statute. The Court's narrow decision, however, ignores important constitutional considerations underlying the issue of compelling attorney service in civil
actions. As a result, state statutes that might have been affected by a constitutional holding remain unaffected. This Note contends that uncompensated compulsory civil appointments are unconstitutional. Consequently, legislative action
is needed to establish a constitutional system for such appointments.
In 1987 the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP) selected 4 John Mallard to
represent two indigent inmates and one indigent former inmate in their suit
against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 After reviewing the case file,
Mallard filed a motion to withdraw from representation, contending that he
lacked the requisite skill and experience to represent the inmates. 6 He added
1. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The statute provides: "[tihe court may request an attorney to
represent any such person [claiming in forma pauperis status] unable to employ counsel and may
dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." Id. "In forma pauperis" may be defined as "in the character of a pauper." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
3. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1816.
4. The VLP compiles a list of all attorneys admitted to practice before the District Court of
the Southern District of Iowa who are in good standing and who have litigated non-bankruptcy
claims in the past five years. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Mallard(No. 87-1490). Attorneys who have
volunteered for VLP referrals of pro bono state cases are deleted from the list. Id. The VLP then
selects attorneys from the list for § 1915(d) assignments. Mallard, 109 S.'Ct. at 1816-17. Attorneys
who are chosen are reimbursed for out-of-pocket costs and they may keep any fee awards provided
by statute. The attorneys, however, are not guaranteed any compensation for their own services. Id.
5. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. The indigents alleged that prison guards had filed false disciplinary reports against them, physically abused them, and endangered their lives by exposing them
as informants. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (civil action for deprivation of rights by any person
acting under color of law of any state).
6. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1
(1983).
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that he would willingly volunteer his services in an area in which he had more

expertise, such as bankruptcy and securities law.7 After a magistrate denied his
motion, Mallard appealed to the federal district court, reasserting his former

arguments.8 He further claimed that because he was not a litigator by training
or temperament, compelling him to take the case would force him to violate his

ethical obligation to handle only matters for which he was competent. 9 The
district court upheld the magistrate's decision. 10 The court cited Mallard's brief

as evidence that he was a qualified attorney and stated that under section
1915(d), it had the power to make compulsory appointments in civil cases. 11

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, without opinion,
denied Mallard's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to
allow his withdrawal.12
In 1988 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 13 to resolve the

conflict among the courts of appeals over whether section 1915(d) authorizes
compulsory assignments of attorneys in civil cases. 14 The issue was one of first
impression for the Court. In a five-to-four decision,1 5 the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that section 1915(d) does not authorize
courts to force unwilling attorneys to represent indigents in civil cases. 1 6 Justice

Brennan, writing for the majority, viewed the issue in Mallardprimarily as one
of statutory interpretation rather than one of federal courts' inherent author-

ity.17 Section 1915(d) provides that "the court may request an attorney to represent any such person [claiming in forma pauperis status] unable to employ
counsel." 18 The Court emphasized that the section's operative term, "request,"
has a plain meaning that courts should respect. 19 Justice Brennan stated that
"[t]o request tthat somebody do something is to express a desire that he do it,
'20
even though he may not generally be disciplined or sanctioned if he declines."

7. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see supra note 6.
10. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817 (the district court opinion is reprinted in Petitioner's Brief in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2a, Mallard (No. 87-1490)).
11. Id.
12. Id. (a copy of the order is attached to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at la, Mallard(No. 87-1490)).
13. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct. 51 (1988) (granting
certiorari).
14. See infra notes 51-75 and accompanying text for discussion of the conflict among the
circuits.
15. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Brennan in
the majority opinion. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1816. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion
emphasizing that the majority decision in no way meant to discourage the traditional obligation of
attorneys to represent indigents. Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. The court refused to address the issue of inherent authority because such authority was not
cited by the lower courts as a basis for their opinions. Id. at 1823.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) (emphasis added); see also supra note 2 (quoting statute).
19. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818. The Court consistently has held that statutes should be given
their plain and obvious meanings. See, eg., Ex Pare Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61-67 (1949); Hilton v.
Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 329 (1948); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925).
20. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
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The Court decided that Congress' choice of the word "request" was significant
because "assignment" or "appointment" of counsel typically denotes the imposition of a duty to undertake representation that courts may enforce. 2 ' The majority observed that "Congress evidently knew how to require service when it
deemed compulsory service appropriate."'2 2 The Court noted that various federal statutes enacted subsequent to section 1915(d) authorize courts to provide
counsel in certain types of actions and use the terms "assign" and "appoint"
rather than "request."' 23 For example, Congress enacted section 1915(c) concurthe term "shall" in referrently with section 1915(d), and section 1915(c) uses
24
witnesses.
and
officers
court
of
duties
the
to
ence
As a final basis for the Court's interpretation of section 1915(d), Justice
Brennan pointed to the statute's legislative history. At the time of the statute's
enactment in 1892,25 at least twelve states had laws permitting their courts to
"assign" or "appoint" attorneys for indigents in civil cases. 26 In refusing to
adopt the terminology of these state statutes, Congress' conscious choice of the
term "request" evinced "a desire to permit attorneys to decline representation of
indigent litigants if in their view their personal, professional, or ethical concerns
bid them [to] do so. ' ' 27
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens focused on an attorney's duty to
represent indigents and the longstanding tradition of court-appointed assignments. 28 He asserted that the majority's interpretation would render the statute
meaningless because courts already had the authority to request attorney cooperation. 29 He "attach[ed] no particular significance to the difference, if any, between the ordinary meaning of the word 'request' . . .and [the meaning of]
'assign' or 'appoint.' "30 Justice Stevens concluded that the word "request" in
31
section 1915(d) should be constrned to mean "respectfully command."
Unless an indigent litigant has a right to counsel, the issue whether a particular attorney must represent her cannot arise. Thus, the development of an indi21. Id. at 1820 n.4; see also United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir.
1986) ("As the terms are commonly understood, an attorney may decline a request but not an
appointment.").
22. Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1818.

23. Id. at 1821. The Court referred to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982) ("appoint"; criminal proceeding); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1982) ("appoint"; Indian child custody proceedings); 42 U.S.C. § 1971(f)
(1982) ("assign"; defendant in voting rights case); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982) ("appoint"; civil
rights action); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982) ("appoint"; Title VII action). Congress has

amended section 1915(d) periodically, but the original "request" language remains unchanged. See,
eg., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590; Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72,
§ 98, 63 Stat. 89, 104.
24. Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1818; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982) ("The officers of the court shall
issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other
cases, and the same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.").
25. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 257 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1982)).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1819.
Id.
Id. at 1823-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J.,
Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J.,
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gent's right to counsel was a necessary precursor to the issue raised in Mallard.
Providing voluntary legal services to those unable to afford it is an ancient tradi33
32
tion, dating as far back as the reign of Henry VII and even to Roman times.

In colonial America, courts had common law and statutory authority to assign
34
counsel upon request for capital defendants who were unable to retain counsel.
Then in 1790, Congress passed a law requiring assignment of counsel at the
request of any person accused of treason or any other capital federal crime. 35
For the criminally accused, the right to counsel was not secured in the state
and federal courts until 1963. In the 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainwright 36 the

Supreme Court declared that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to appointed counsel is a fundamental right. 37 As such, it is obligatory on the states
38
through the fourteenth amendment.
Conversely, in civil cases indigents have no general right to appointed counsel. 3 9 In 1892 Congress passed a statute giving federal courts the authority to

allow in forma pauperis actions. 4° The purpose of the statute was to open up the

federal courts to poor persons. 4 1 As introduced, it was to provide "when a

plaintiff may sue as a poor person, and when counsel shall be assigned by the
court." 4 2 This provision of counsel is a privilege, however, rather than a right.
The statute leaves the decision whether to request counsel to the discretion of
32. See id. at 1824, 1825 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. See, eg., Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 735, 73940 (1980) (discussing the difficulties of basing arguments for compulsory service on Roman, English,
and American tradition). The majority in Mallard referred to Shapiro's article twice in its opinion.
See Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1819-20. The Mallard dissent criticized the majority's "reliance" on the
article. Id. at 1825 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (1965) (the court attached to its decision
portions of appellant's brief that traced the origins and history of the attorney's obligation to serve
upon court appointment), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
35. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118.
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. Id. at 341; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for the defense."); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 463-64 (1938) (in federal courts, courts must appoint counsel for defendants unable to
employ counsel unless such defendents completely and intelligently waive the right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) ("the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental
character").
38. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44.
39. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981); Peterson v. Nadler, 452
F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971). In decisions subsequent to Gideon, however, the Court indicated that
the right established in criminal actions could extend to the civil context in cases involving very
fundamental interests. For example, a defendant may have a right to counsel in juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) (even though the proceedings are civil rather than criminal, the fourteenth amendment requires that in proceedings that may result in a juvenile's
confinement to an institution, the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel); parole revocation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (court must determine need for appointed counsel on
a case-by-case basis; in some instances fundamental fairness requires appointed counsel); and parental rights actions, Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
40. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

(1982)) (the language of the current statute is essentially unchanged from that of the original).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1892).
42. Id. A member of the House introduced the bill in this way. The term "assign," however,
did not appear anywhere in the bill itself.
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the court,43 and the court will choose to appoint counsel only in extraordinary
circumstances, after a careful balancing of various factors. 44 Because this is only

a privilege, an indigent cannot dispute a denial by contending that he was denied
a right to counsel. He can only challenge the trial judge's decision as an abuse of
discretion. Furthermore, the court's authority is a general authority to provide

this power allows a court to "require" the
counsel; the question remains whether
45
attorney.
particular
a
of
services
Until Mallardthe Supreme Court had never addressed the issue of compelling a particular attorney to represent an indigent. The federal courts of appeals
have dealt more directly with this issue. Attorneys frequently challenge courtordered appointments on a consitutional basis that compelling such service without compensation constitutes a "taking" of an attorney's property under the fifth
amendment. 46 Although many state courts have accepted this argument, 47 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected it in the leading
case of United States v. Dillon.48 That court based its decision primarily upon
what it deemed to be the tradition of the profession to serve indigents upon court
order. The court stated:
representation of indigents under court order, without a fee, is a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the
court .... [A]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be
deemed to be aware of the traditions .... Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation. 49
Therefore, the court held that such an assignment does not constitute a taking of
an attorney's services. 50 Although Dillon was a criminal case, the court did not
43. See, eg., Garrison v. Lacey, 362 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911
(1967); United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965); Sierra v. Lehigh
County, 617 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
44. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986). Some of the
various factors include the merits of the plaintiff's claim, whether representation of both sides by
persons trained in presentation of evidence and cross-examination would better serve the search for
truth, capability of the plaintiff to present his case, complexity of the legal issues that the claim
raises, and plaintiff's working knowledge of the legal process. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-

89 (7th Cir. 1981).
45. Even when an indigent has a right to counsel rather than simply a privilege, it does not
necessarily follow that the court can compel a particular attorney to represent the indigent; compulsory service is a separate inquiry. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."). For a discussion of how this amendment applies to the states, see Chicago B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
47. See, eg., Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447
P.2d 193 (Utah 1968).
48. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). In Dillon the appointed
attorney applied for compensation after representing the plaintiff in connection with proceedings to
vacate a judgment of conviction. It is unclear whether the attorney originally consented to the
appointment. See id. at 633-34. Other courts have followed this decision in holding that compelling
attorney representation of indigents does not amount to a taking under the Constitution. See, eg.,
Family Div. of Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1982); cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973)
("fifth amendment does not require that the Government pay for the performance of a duty it is
already owed") (witness fees).
49. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635.
50. Id. The court quoted Powell v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court stated that
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distinguish between criminal and civil actions in its discussion of professional

tradition.
Because constitutional challenges to court appointments frequently are rejected,5 1 attorneys appointed pursuant to section 1915(d) often challenge their
appointments on statutory grounds. They argue that the statute only authorizes

a court to "request" an attorney to represent an indigent and does not authorize
the court to "require" such service. Federal courts are split over the response to
this argument.5 2 Some courts read the statute narrowly, as did the Mallard
Court, agreeing that it authorizes the court only to request service from an attor-

ney.5 3 Other courts have interpreted it more broadly, holding that courts can
54
require attorneys to represent indigents.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit directly addressed the issue of compelled service by a particular attorney under section
1915(d) in United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land.5 5 In 30.64 Acres plaintiff appearedpro se at a trial in which he was awarded a jury verdict of $22,240 against

57
the United States for the taking of his land.5 6 The court of appeals reversed.

"[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an
appointment." Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932)). Courts often quote this
dictum in support of appointments. See, eg., United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 1412 (3d
Cir. 1988); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214
(1983).
51. Eg., Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635-36 (no taking under fourteenth amendment); Sparks v. Parker,
368 So. 2d 528, 531-34 (Ala.) (attorney appointments do not constitute takings under the fifth
amendment or involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 803 (1979); cf.Hurtado,410 U.S. 578 at 588-89 (incarceration of material witnesses without
just fees is not a taking under fifth amendment).
52. Compare United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801-03 (9th Cir. 1986)
(§ 1915(d) does not authorize compulsory appointments) and Caruth,683 F.2d at 1049 (same) with
Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) (§ 1915(d) permits mandatory assignments) and Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (same).
53. See, eg., Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1971); Gray v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Health, 495 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
54. See, eg., Peterson, 452 F.2d at 757. Many courts never reach the issue of § 1915(d)'s "request" language because they find instead that the lower court did not exercise its discretion properly
in the first place. See, eg., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 59-62 (2d Cir. 1986) (lower court
did not consider appropriate factors in exercising its discretion); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315,
1319-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (district court operated under mistaken impression that it had no authority
to appoint counsel; therefore, court did not consider the relevant factors necessary under § 1915(d)),

A trial court's exercise of discretion seldom is reversed on appeal. But see Whisenant, 739 F,2d at
163-64 (appeals court reversed trial court's denial of defendant's request for counsel; lack of counsel
led to "fundamentally unfair trial." Still other courts simply have used the terms "request" and
"appoint" interchangeably and have ignored any distinction between them. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Van
Epps, 428 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970); Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 430-31 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967). A striking number of lower courts have used the term
"appoint" when referring to the court's authority under § 1915(d). See, e.g., Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60;
Reynolds v. Foree, 771 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1985); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th

Cir. 1981); Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1965); Sierra v. Lehigh County, Pa., 617 F.
Supp. 427, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Jackson v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 755, 755-56 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
One court went so far as to say that an attorney impliedly consented to a court appointment, even
though the attorney would have been disbarred for refusal. Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir,
1987) (attorney claimed lack of competence and time to represent indigents in § 1983 action; magistrate denied attorney's request to be excused and indicated that attorney's membership in bar might
be terminated if he declined the assignment).
55. 795 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 797.
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On remand, the district court awarded plaintiff $3,676.58 At the second trial,
plaintiff filed a motion for appointed counsel, but the district court denied it
without explanation, 59 commenting only that "I know nothing in this case that
allows this court to appoint ...an attorney for you." 6 Plaintiff argued that the
district court erred as a matter of law by denying his motion "on the mistaken
ground that the court lacked the authority to grant it."'6 1 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section 1915(d) does not auto represent indigents, so the court can only
thorize courts to compel attorneys
"request" such representation. 62 The court remanded the case, however, because the trial court had not exercised discretion under section 1915(d) in determining whether to appoint counsel; the trial court erroneously had assumed that
it had no authority and thus made no further inquiry. 63 As a result, the lower
a party in obtaining councourt failed in its "duty under section 1915(d) to assist
64
sel willing to serve for little or no compensation."
The 30.64 Acres court discussed the prevailing confusion over whether section 1915(d) authorizes mandatory appointments. It attributed this confusion
partially to the fact that section 1915(d) motions are rare because courts will
secure counsel for indigents only under exceptional circumstances. 65 In addition, the broad discretion given trial judges makes appellate reversal of denials
equally rare. 66 Consequently, courts have little incentive to choose their language carefully in considering section 1915(d) motions. 67 Furthermore, the
court noted that many courts use the word "appoint" to designate a pro bono
volunteer, thereby issuing orders "appointing" counsel when in fact the attorney
already has volunteered or has agreed to represent when asked. 68 Rejecting the
reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which
had held that the statute authorizes appointments, the court held that the plain

language of 1915(d) authorizes only a request..69 In support of its conclusion,
the court pointed to other statutes using terms such as "appoint" and "assign"
and noted that such statutes usually
when authorizing appointment of counsel,
70
provide for compensating such counsel.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 798.
59. There was evidence that plaintiff was totally physically and mentally disabled. Id. at 79798.
60. Id. at 798.
61. Id. at 797-98.
62. Id. at 803.
63. Id. at 804.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 799.
66. Id. at 800.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 801; see infra notes 71-75 for discussion of the Eighth Circuit approach.
70. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801. The court also cited the Fifth and Sixth Circuit opinions in
accord with its opinion. Id. at 802 (citing Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1982); Reid
v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47,47 (6th Cir. 1956)). The court did not mention Dillon, also a Ninth Circuit
decision, perhaps because the Dillon court did not rely on § 1915(d). See United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
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As the 30.64 Acres court noted, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
taken a different approach. In Peterson v. Nadler7 1 an indigent prisoner filed
suit against his former attorney alleging that the attorney had fraudulently converted his automobile by wrongfully selling it after plaintiff went to prison. The
trial court permitted plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, and plaintiff requested a court-appointed attorney.72 The district court ruled that it had no
power to appoint an attorney in a civil action. 73 The court of appeals reversed
and siated that under section 1915(d) federal courts possess explicit statutory
authority to make compulsory appointments. 74 The court simply cited the statute, however, and did not discuss any interpretation of the word "request" or
the rationale for its decision that the statute granted this authority. 7 5
The Supreme Court in Mallardrejected the Eighth Circuit's approach and
essentially agreed with the position and rationale of 30.64 Acres. The Mallard
majority held that the statute says "request," means request, and authorizes only
a request. 76 The dissent, however, argued that Mallardinvolved more than just
statutory interpretation. 77 Justice Stevens focused primarily on the legal profession's tradition of court-appointed counsel for indigent representation. He
stated that "a court's power to require a lawyer to render assistance to the indigent is firmly rooted in the authority to define the terms and conditions upon
which members are admitted to the bar."78 Justice Stevens declined to address
the issue of inherent authority, as did the majority. He reasoned that the strong
tradition of the bar representing indigents upon court order compelled his conclusion that section 1915(d)'s "request" language means "respectfully command."'79 Justice Stevens' reliance on tradition, however, assumes that courts
have inherent authority to appoint counsel, in which case it does seem that
counsel cannot refuse to serve once appointed. If courts in fact have this power
already, then to say that section 1915(d) authorizes appointments would be to
say that the statute adds little, if anything, to the court's pre-existing authority.
71. 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 755-56.

73. Id. at 756.
74. Id. at 757.
75. Id.
76. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818-23.

77. Id. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("this case involves much more than the parsing of the
plain meaning of the word request"). The dissent noted that statutes cited by the majority as evidence that Congress used different language, such as "appoint" or "assign," when it intended to

authorize compulsory service, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982), were enacted because of defects in
the system in which courts did not appoint attorneys until the defendant was arraigned. Therefore,
Justice Stevens argued, these statutes cannot support the proposition that Congress in 1892 did not

intend to give the courts authority to require representation of indigents. Id. at 1826 & n.8 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).

78. Id. at 1824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One commentator suggests that "although frequently

urged as rooted in the firmest of traditions, the 'duty to serve' in fact has a history shrouded in
obscurity, ambiguity and qualification," and hence should not be used as the primary justification for
forcing attorney service. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 738; see also Note, CourtAppointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionalityof Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
366, 373-76 (1981) (rejecting the proposition that the "officers of the court" doctrine may provide

authority for subjecting attorneys to an otherwise unconstitutional burden to carry out court appointments). See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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This is exactly the dissent's criticism of the majority's opinion. Again, Justice
Stevens argued that under the majority's interpretation the statute is rendered
"virtually meaningless," 80 granting the courts no more power than they already
possess.
As the majority noted, however, "statutory provisions may simply codify
existing rights or powers.... Section 1915(d) plays a useful role in the statutory
scheme if it informs lawyers that the court's requests ... are appropriate requests." 8 1 Although it may seem that a court can request anything of an attorney, some requests might be improper. For example, the majority pointed out
that a judge cannot "request to cut short cross-examination so that he can go
fishing." 82 Granted, a request that an attorney represent a litigant does not
seem as unreasonable as the majority's example. Absent statutory authority,
however, an attorney may experience real anxiety over whether the judge may
make such a request and whether she may refuse. The statute, therefore, legitimizes a court's request to an attorney to represent a poor litigant. 83 The majority's interpretation, even if it adds little to the courts' power, is at least consistent
with the plain, ordinary meaning of the statute's operative term "request."
Conversely, the dissent's explanation of why Congress used the word "request" if it meant "require" is unpersuasive. Justice Stevens stated that "[ilt is
evident that the drafters of this statute understood these terms [request and assign] to impose similar obligations and simply assumed that members of our
profession would perform their assigned tasks when requested to do so by the
court."' 84 He based this contention on the fact that the statute was introduced as
"[ain Act providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor person and when counsel
shall be assigned by the court."8 5 The word "assign," however, does not appear
anywhere in the statute itself and the majority believed that the statute's text
controlled. 86 Moreover, as Mallard noted in his brief, this was not the official
87
title of the bill-it was simply the way the bill was introduced on the floor.
Although the Court left many questions unanswered, the Mallard Court
properly interpreted the plain language of the statute. Although there are, and
should be, strong ethical obligations on the part of attorneys to represent indigents, Congress chose not to enforce them through court order in section
1915(d). Not only did the 1892 Congress decline to use the term "require" or
"assign" in the statute, since then Congress has passed up several opportunities
80. Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1821.
82. Id.

83. See id.
84. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1820, n.4.
87. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6n.7, Mallard(No. 87-1490). Mallard argued that Congress
surely chose the textual language of the bill more carefully than the proponent of the statute chose
when introducing the bill on the floor of the House. Id. Furthermore, Mallard noted that Congress

did not pass the bill based upon its general description as uttered by the person who introduced it.
The legislators voted on the basis of the statutory language itself. Id.
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to revise the language of the statute to include these terms if it so intended. 88

Although the Mallard Court correctly decided the narrow statutory interpretation issue, it failed to address any of the important constitutional issues
surrounding compulsory attorney service. 89 As a result, the decision gives little
guidance to the states in framing and amending their indigent representation
laws. If forcing attorney service is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court is al-

lowing the practices of some states to go unchecked. Because the Court limited
its decision to an interpretation of a federal statute only, the state statutes remain unaffected.
The most frequently raised constitutional challenge to compulsory appointments is that such appointments constitute "takings" of attorneys' property

without compensation, in violation of the fifth amendment. 90 The Supreme

Court has never defined the term "taking" precisely. 91 Indeed, the Court has

expressly refused to adopt any rigid rules or a formula to use in making the
determination whether a taking has occurred. 92 The general purpose of the

clause, however, is to prevent the "'[g]overnment from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne

by the public as a whole.' ,93 Forcing attorneys to bear the burden of representing indigents falls squarely within this proscription.

A determination of taking involves two elements: a finding that the appropriated subject is property and a determination that the government has taken
the property. Although the amendment's proscription applies most clearly in

the context of governmental acquisition of private property, 94 courts have extended it to a variety of contexts including personal property9" and intangibles. 96 Most courts that have considered the issue have held that an

attorney's services constitute property. 97 Her ideas, knowledge, and services are
88. Congress has amended the statute periodically since 1892; however, the term "request"
remains unchanged. See supra note 23.
89. The Court stated that because the parties did not raise these issues in the lower courts, it
would not address them. Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1823.
90. See U.S. CONST.amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
.91. See Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes "Taking" Within Meaning
of Fifth Amendment's Prohibition Against Taking of Private Propertyfor Public Use Without Just
Compensation, 89 L. Ed. 2d 977, 983 (1988).
92. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
93. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
94. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government. ,%."),
95. United States v. 19.86 Acres of Land in East St. Louis, 141 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1944) (factory building); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. City of Fairmont, 243 Minn. 176, 67 N.W.2d 41
(1954) (condemnation of utility gas company authorized even though its properties consisted of
about 90% personal property).
96. The Supreme Court has extended the concept of property to include intangibles. See, e.g.,
City of Cincinnati Y.Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) (chose in action); United
States v. Bums, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246, 252 (1870) (patent rights); see also City of Thibodaux v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d 24, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (franchises).
97. See Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958
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her stock in trade. The product of her labor takes the form of opinions, advice,
and advocacy. These are intangible property, but property nonetheless. 98 Furthermore, the Supreme Court appears to have accepted that personal services
can constitute property that may be subject to taking by the government. 99
As for the taking element, if the government forces an unwilling attorney to
provide her services for the public benefit, under threat of sanctions, her property has been taken. As one commentator aptly noted, "[a]n obligation to perform certain work, backed by the sanction of contempt, professional discipline,
or loss of livelihood, is about as direct an invasion of a person's control over his
labor as can be imagined." 1° ° Once the government appropriates and uses a
person's labor, there clearly has been a "taking."
Finally, in the case of compulsory assignments in civil cases, unless a statute provides for it, an attorney is not guaranteed any compensation for her services. Zero compensation certainly cannot qualify as "just compensation."
Accordingly, in a case like Mallard's, the district court's holding that it had the
authority to force Mallard to represent the indigents would be unconstitutional
under the fifth amendment.
There are, however, arguments as to why such an appointment should not
be considered unconstitutional. In its influential decision,10 1 the Dillon 102 court
focused on tradition and an implied consent theory in rejecting the constitu10 3
tional "taking" challenge to attorney appointment without compensation.
The court argued that
[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be
aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to
know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the
court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation
upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed,'
this obligation and when he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a "taking of his services." 1° 4
Underlying this consent theory is the alleged strength of tradition and duty
associated with court appointments for indigents. The Dillon court referred to
the "ancient and established tradition"10 5 of such appointments. The Court ar(1966); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,
447 P.2d 193 (1968).
98. See supra note 96.

99. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 n.11 (1967) (" 'the right to hold specific
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the Fifth Amendment' ") (quoting
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (conceding
that "for some purposes labor must be considered as property").
100. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 774.
101. Subsequent opinions often cite or quote Dillon without discussion. See, e.g., Family Div.
Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir.
1965); State v. Ruiz, 602 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Ark. 1980).
102. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for further discussion of Dillon.
103. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635-36.
104. Id. at 635.
105. Id.
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gued that attorneys are licensed to practice as "Officers of the Court.' 1 0 6 Presumably the role places attorneys in a unique relationship with the court.
Consequently, they are entitled to certain benefits and are in turn burdened with
certain duties. As a result of this relationship and the accompanying benefits,

attorneys have an obligation to accept compulsory appointments.
This notion of consent is problematic, however. First, it is a dubious assumption that an attorney understands when he becomes a member of the bar
that he sometimes will be forced to represent a client that he does not want to
represent without compensation. One hopes that prospective attorneys understand that the profession has a strong tradition of providing pro bono service.
Most attorneys probably understand this tradition, however, as an ethical obligation, not a mandatory requirement.10 7 Even if an attorney knows that he will
be listed in his jurisdiction as available for court assignments, he might not know
that he could be compelled to accept a particular assignment.
Moreover, the tradition underlying this consent theory is the product of a
misleading analogy. The court's power over an officer of the court dates back to
the early English system in which attorneys were considered officers of the court
and were subject to the court's discipline, just as members of its clerical staff. 0 8
These attorneys did not plead or defend clients; instead, they primarily performed ministerial tasks. In contrast, English barristers pleaded and defended
suits and were admitted to practice by self-regulating professional organizations.10 9 As opposed to the attorneys, barristers were never considered officers
of the court. American attorneys more closely resemble these English barristers, 110 who owed duties to the King, not to the court."' 1 A privately practicing
attorney is not an employee of the government or of the court and is simply not
an "officer of the court" in the traditional sense. Therefore, the officer of the
court doctrine does not support a court's authority to compel attorney service. 1 2 Although a tradition exists, this is not necessarily an "ancient and established" tradition understood by all those who join the bar.
Another justification for the assertion that there has been no taking of an
attorney's property is the fact that attorneys receive reciprocal benefits as a result of state licensure.11 3 Other professionals, however, also must be licensed by
the state, yet no one has suggested that these professionals therefore owe the
state a duty to provide their services free of charge to indigents. For example,
106. But see infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (concept of attorneys as officers of court
based on misinterpretation of history).
107. The ABA's Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility does not suggest such a requirement,

and one can imagine that such a requirement might come as a surprise to many attorneys. See infra
notes 116-7 and accompanying text.

108. Note, supra note 79, at 374.
109.
110.
stantial
111.

Id.
While the American attorney more closely resembles the English barrister, there are subdifferences between the two. See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 746-47.
Note, supra note 79, at 374.

112. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 745-49.
113. State licensure in essence grants attorneys a monopoly in the practice of law. One commentator has noted that "[t]he economic benefit of this monopoly offsets the burden of accepting court
appointments." Note, supra note .79, at 388.
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physicians are not required to treat poor persons without receiving compensa-

tion for their services. By singling out attorneys from the rest of society, the
state is putting a burden on select individuals rather than on all members of
14
society. This selectivity is exactly what the fifth amendment prohibits.
The notions of tradition and duty are not strong enough to refute that com-

pelling attorney service without compensation constitutes a clear form of taking.

It is difficult to imagine anything closer to the proscription of the fifth amendment than forcing someone to work for the government for free-not only fail-

ing to receive compensation, but forgoing income as well. Granted, the
government may determine that it needs a person's property or services in order

to provide for a public need, and it may take that property or those services.
The fifth amendment, however, requires the government to compensate the per-

son whose property has been appropriated.
A system for providing representation for indigents that passes constitutional muster is possible.' 15 Yet the question remains whether, as a matter of

policy, attorneys should be compelled to represent indigents who are unable to
secure counsel. The American Bar Association's periodic proposals for
mandatory pro bono service requirements in its Canons of Professional Ethics

evidence the ongoing debate over this issue.1 16 The A.B.A., however, has never
11 7
fully accepted or implemented these proposals.

In addition to upholding a noble tradition of the profession,118 there is a
valid public interest in assuring that poor persons have the same access to the
legal system as the more fortunate.
limited means, the poor may have
cess. Providing an ample supply
quirements would help to ensure
system.

Because they have more at stake due to their
an even stronger interest in having court acof attorneys through mandatory service rethat the poor have this access to the legal

Although a mandatory pro bono service requirement may be good policy, it
114. The state has the power to extract certain minimal services from its citizens as a whole.
See, eg., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973) (statute providing incarcerated
witnesses only a dollar per day for the period before trial held constitutional); Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (statute requiring all able-bodied men to work on public roads held constitutional). These types of burdens however, fall on all citizens, not just a select group. Perhaps a small
amount of service extracted from an attorney, with or without compensation, could be compared to
this type of civic duty.
115. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
116. See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 735-38.
117. See id. at 738. Currently, the A.B.A.'s Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility currently
provides that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer ....
Every lawyer... should find time to participate in
serving the disadvantaged.... Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for
legal services." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-25 (1981) (emphasis added). The A.B.A. Model Rules provide that "[a] lawyer should render public interest legal service.
A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced
fee to persons of limited means or to public service or to charitable groups ....
MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) (emphasis added). Most importantly, the Comment to
the Model Rules provides that Rule 6.1 expresses the policy of providing public service, "but is not
intended to be enforced through disciplinary process." Id. comment.
118. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("it is precisely because our
duties go beyond what the law demands that ours remains a noble profession").
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does not follow that courts should require a particular attorney to represent a
particular person in a particular case. Forcing an attorney to accept a case that
he does not want to accept seems unwise and is certainly undesirable. The disinterested attorney would be less likely to devote an adequate amount of time and
energy to a forced representation. 1 9 Thus, the litigant probably would not receive the quality of representation that she deserved.
In addition, it is inefficient to require a particular lawyer to take on a particular case. In Mallard the court wanted to force Mallard, who was experienced
in bankruptcy and securities law, to represent inmates in a complex section 1983
action. Mallard responded that he was not a litigator by training or tempera20
ment and therefore would not be able to provide effective representation.'
Given the abundance of lawyers in the country today and the wide diversity of
their practices, the court easily could have found an attorney with at least some
familiarity in such matters. An attorney familiar with civil rights cases under
section 1983 arguably would have provided better representation to Mallard's
clients. It is more practical to allow attorneys to choosepro bono assignments in
areas and actions in which they are interested or experienced. It is also more
efficient because lawyers would not waste time and resources gaining competency in unfamiliar areas of law. If an attorney is working on a case that involves an area of the law in which he has experience, and if he has accepted it
because he is interested in the cause, he is far more likely to represent the client's
interests zealously and competently than if a court forces an unwanted case
upon him. Such a forced relationship is contrary to the interests of both the
attorney and the indigent. This analysis necessarily assumes that willing attorneys are available. Although this may be an overly optimistic assumption, the
foregoing points are important considerations.
A reluctance to force attorneys into service is understandable. In criminal
actions, courts justify such forced service on the ground that the strong interests
and liberties at stake in criminal actions outweigh the possible detriment to an
attorney forced to represent a defendant in a criminal case. In addition, such
representation usually is compensated.' 2 ' On the other hand, in civil actions
these interests are not as vital because there is no threat to the indigent's personal liberty. Thus, courts should give considerable weight to the burden that is
placed on the attorney, especially if he is uncompensated.
By providing an in forma pauperis statute, our society has made a value
judgment that an indigent with a valid claim should be represented by counsel.
In most instances, inadequate representation is better than no representation at
all. If the poor are being denied access to the courts, Congress' original intent
for the in forma pauperis statute is not being realized and Congress should consider modification.
119. The attorney's conduct may raise questions of malpractice or discipline for neglect and
incompetency, but it is a realistic assumption that his preparation would be less thorough if he were
not interested in the case.
120. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.

121. See 18 U.S.C. § 3000A(d) (1982).
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In light of the constitutional difficulties, any extension of section 1915(d) to
mandate representation by an unwilling attorney will require legislative action.1 22 One possible solution is to establish a fund to ensure that appointed
attorneys are compensated. North Carolina, for example, has a fund set up as
part of its indigent representation system and requires indigent litigants to reimburse the fund when at all possible.1 23 Another possibility is to impose a tax on
all citizens that would subsidize such representation.1 24 Under either approach,
if a court had to resort to appointing an attorney to represent an indigent, 125 the
attorney would be compensated, and there would be no taking of his services.
Although the details of any proposal would need to be worked out by the legislature, it is possible for a system of attorney appointments in civil actions to survive constitutional scrutiny. The tradition of indigent representation is a noble
one, however, the state must be mindful of the constitutional rights of those who
carry on that tradition.
BETH M. COLEMAN

122. In addition, state legislatures should amend statutes that would be rendered unconstitutional under this analysis.
123. Telephone interview (Dec. 20, 1989) with Franklin Freeman, Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts of North Carolina. Mr. Freeman described the Indigent Persons' Attorney's Fee Fund. See generally N.C.G.S. § 7A-450 (1989).
124. See, eg., Shapiro, supranote 33, at 781-786. Professor Shapiro explored the possibility of a
tax on attorneys, as well as the possibility of having the adversary party pay the litigation expenses.
125. Appointment might still be necessary in the case of an indigent with an unpopular cause
that no attorney wants to take.

